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WHO CARES? 
A.C. PRITCHARD∗ 
Jim Cox and Randall Thomas have identified an interesting phenomenon 
in their contribution to this symposium: institutional investors seem to be 
systematically “leaving money on the table” in securities fraud class actions.1 
For someone who approaches legal questions from an economic perspective, 
the initial response to this claim is disbelief. As the joke goes, economists do 
not bend over to pick up twenty-dollar bills on the street. The economist 
knows that the twenty dollars must be an illusion. In a world of rational 
actors, someone else already would have picked up that twenty-dollar bill, so 
the effort spent bending over would be a waste. But Cox and Thomas provide 
persuasive evidence that the overwhelming majority of institutional investors 
cannot be bothered to file claims that would allow them to recover their share 
of the settlement in securities class actions.  
Should we care that institutional investors do not care? Cox and Thomas 
also make a persuasive case that institutional managers who fail to file claims 
in settled securities class actions are violating their fiduciary duties. Filing a 
claim is a purely ministerial task. Even if the settlement is modest, the return 
from filing the claim is likely to far exceed the costs. My wife spends more 
time filling out sweepstakes entries with much smaller expected values.  
Less clear, however, is whether the investors in these institutions should 
care that their fiduciaries are not making claims. Money managers may be 
violating their fiduciary duties by leaving money on the table. How much 
money is another question. Cox and Thomas suggest that there is a 
“tremendous amount of money available in these settlements,” (estimated at 
$8.39 billion over the past three years).2 To you or me, $8.39 billion might 
seem like real money, but before we start filing derivative claims alleging 
waste, we should take a closer look at this number. Relative to the amount of 
money that these institutions manage, $8.39 billion may not be all that 
significant. In the year 2000, insurance companies, public and private 
pension funds, and mutual funds managed $16 trillion.3 If we make the 
ballpark assumptions that institutions are entitled to half of the class action 
settlements, and three-quarters of the institutions are not filing claims, then 
those non-filing institutions are leaving $1.05 billion on the table per year—a 
 ∗  Assistant Professor, University of Michigan Law School. 
 1. James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Leaving Money on the Table: Do Institutional Investors 
Fail to File Claims in Securities Class Actions?, 80:3 WASH. U. L.Q. 855 (2002). 
 2. Id. at 871. 
 3. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, tbl.1163 (2001). 
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staggering 0.087% of assets under management. Perhaps I am slightly 
understating the amounts available under class action settlements, but I think 
that most people—including the institutions ignoring class action 
settlements—would consider 0.087% to be in the range of a rounding error. 
It seems unlikely that such a small percentage would make a difference in the 
competition to attract investors. Perhaps money managers have more 
important things to worry about. For example, money managers may spend 
their time investigating companies so as to avoid investing in fraudulent 
firms. 
Perhaps policymakers should have other concerns as well. The apparent 
sloppiness of institutional practices in preserving trust assets, for example, 
offends most people’s sense of order and good stewardship. But from a 
societal perspective, the money that one institution leaves on the table simply 
goes to another institution. The second institution takes the trouble to file a 
claim, while the first cannot be bothered. Surely there is no unjust enrichment 
in this situation. The money is not returned to the defendants. It is difficult to 
see any important misallocation of resources—just sloppiness. 
The mathematical exercise above does, however, suggest a point that is 
far from trivial: the compensation provided to defrauded investors by 
securities class actions has a negligible effect on investment returns. No 
reasonable investor considering where to allocate his savings (real estate, 
bank accounts, bonds, stocks, etc.) would take into account the availability of 
class action settlements. One of the principal arguments of defenders of 
securities fraud class actions—that they provide important compensation to 
defrauded investors4—is impossible to square with the available evidence. 
Cox and Thomas’s empirical finding confirms the theoretical intuition that 
investors seeking to protect themselves from fraud do so through 
diversification, not lawsuits.5 If they are correct, the sums paid out in 
securities class actions are so trivial that the most sophisticated investors can 
not be bothered to spend the time necessary to fill out and mail a claim form. 
Securities class actions cannot be justified as providing compensation. 
 4. Arthur Levitt, Chairman U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Testimony Before the 
Subcommittee on Telecommunications and Finance Committee on Commerce United States House of 
Representatives Concerning Litigation Reform Proposals, February 10, 1995, at 1 (arguing that class 
actions “serv[e] as the primary vehicle for compensating defrauded investors”) (available at 
www.sec.gov/news/testimony/testarchive/1995/spch025.txt). 
 5. See A.C. Pritchard, Markets as Monitors: A Proposal to Replace Class Actions with 
Exchanges as Securities Fraud Monitors, 85 VA. L. REV. 925 (1999). 
 https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol80/iss3/9
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If compensation is not important, deterrence should animate our securities 
fraud class action regime. Shifting our focus to deterrence might cause us to 
rethink the features of the current regime. Two aspects of the current regime 
come readily to mind: the measure of damages and vicarious liability. Both 
are driven by the goal of compensation and they work together to undermine 
deterrence. 
In the typical securities fraud class action damages are measured by the 
difference between the price paid by the victim and the security’s “true” 
value.6 In the typical case, however, the losses to the victims of fraud on the 
market are entirely offset by the gains to individuals on the other side of the 
trade.7 The damages measure provides no offset for those windfall gains. 
Consequently, the measure of damages in fraud-on-the-market cases can be 
enormous for a security in which there is active trading. Given this downside 
risk, settlement looks like an attractive option for the defendant company, 
even when it believes its prospects of prevailing are good.8 Defendants’ 
inclination to settle gives plaintiffs’ lawyers an incentive to file even weak 
cases.9 Thus, the enormous damages measures available in securities fraud 
class actions result in very imprecise sanctioning. If both strong and weak 
cases lead to settlements, the deterrent effect of class actions is likely to be 
muted at best. 
Corporations’ risk aversion is fueled by agency costs. Plaintiffs’ lawyers 
generally sue the corporation’s officers as well as the firm itself. This seems 
entirely reasonable, given that the most substantial motivations for securities 
fraud involve corporate managers’ misstatements that benefit the managers 
rather than the corporation.10 But the litigation process provides no check on 
continued self-dealing by the managers. Facing personal liability that could 
bankrupt even the wealthiest of individuals, corporate officers are 
 6. See Sirota v. Solitron Devices, Inc., 673 F.2d 566 (2d Cir. 1982) (allowing recovery of the 
difference between price paid and security’s “true value”). 
 7. This ignores gains made by insiders selling on the basis of the fraud. These gains are likely to 
be small, however, relative to the overall damages claimed by the class. Moreover, as noted below, the 
current regime does nothing to induce insiders to disgorge these gains. 
 8. See Janet Cooper Alexander, Rethinking Damages in Securities Class Actions, 48 STAN. L. 
REV. 1487, 1511 (1996) (“The class-based compensatory damages regime in theory imposes remedies 
that are so catastrophically large that defendants are unwilling to go to trial even if they believe the 
chance of being found liable is small.”). 
 9. On the subject of incentives to bring non-meritorious cases, see Lucian Ayre Bebchuk, Suing 
Solely to Extract a Settlement Offer, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 437 (1988); Avery Katz, The Effect of 
Frivolous Lawsuits on the Settlement of Litigation, 10 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 3 (1990); David 
Rosenberg & Steven A. Shavell, A Model in Which Suits Are Brought for their Nuisance Value, 5 
INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 3 (1985). 
 10. See Pritchard, supra note 5. 
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understandably reluctant to go to trial.11 As a result, settlements are nearly 
universal. Of equal importance, settlements allow the officers to avoid a 
finding of intentional wrongdoing.12 Without such a finding, the directors’ 
and officers’ insurer will be compelled to pay the claim.13 By contrast, 
individual corporate officers found liable for a fraud judgment would have a 
hard time shifting that liability to the corporation.14 As a result of the 
universal practice of settlement, officers and directors are usually able to 
walk away without paying anything.15 Directors’ and officers’ insurance pays 
a portion of settlements, with the corporation paying the remainder.16  
 11. See Richard M. Phillips & Gilbert C. Miller, The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 
1995: Rebalancing Litigation Risks and Rewards for Class Action Plaintiffs, Defendants and Lawyers, 
51 BUS. LAW. 1009, 1015 (1996) (“Individual defendants in class action suits were particularly risk 
averse and prone to settle. For them, going to trial, even with a strong defense, ran the risk, however 
slight, of a personally ruinous damage award.”). 
 12. See Raychem Corp. v. Federal Ins. Co., 853 F. Supp. 1170, 1177 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (holding 
that indemnification for settlement costs of 10b-5 action was permissible). 
 13. See Roberta Romano, The Shareholder Suit: Litigation without Foundation?, 7 J. L. ECON. & 
ORG. 55, 57 (1991) (“Policies routinely exempt losses from adjudication of dishonesty, but if a claim 
is settled, courts prohibit insurers from seeking an adjudication of guilt and thereby avoiding the 
claim’s payment.”). 
 Directors and Officers (D&O) insurance pays for settlements because a refusal to pay could 
expose the insurer to potential liability for bad faith refusal to settle. See Janet Cooper Alexander, Do 
the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities Fraud Class Actions, 43 STANFORD L. REV. 
497, 533 (1991) (“The insurer cannot lightly refuse to fund a settlement because it could be subject to 
a claim for bad faith refusal to settle, which could make it liable for the entire amount of any eventual 
judgment, without regard to the policy limits.”); see also id. at 560-66 (discussing insurers incentives 
to settle). 
 14. A fraud judgment is outside the coverage of most directors and officers (D&O) insurance 
policies. Clifford G. Holderness, Liability Insurers as Corporate Monitors, 10 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 
115, 117 (1990) (“[L]iability insurance does not cover obvious conflicts of interest, willful 
misconduct, or acts the accused should have known were illegal.”). See also Joseph P. Monteleone & 
Nicholas J. Conca, Directors and Officers Indemnification and Liability Insurance: An Overview of 
Legal and Practical Issues, 51 BUS. LAW. 573, 598-99 (1996) (excerpting typical provisions from 
D&O policies). Moreover, intentional wrongdoing is also likely to be beyond the corporation’s 
indemnification authority in most states. See, e.g., 8 DEL. CODE ANN. §145 (1993). The Securities and 
Exchange Commission also takes the position that indemnification for securities fraud violations is 
void as against public policy. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 229.512(h)(3). See also Eichenholtz v. Brennan, 52 
F.3d 478, 483 (3d Cir. 1995) (stating that indemnification “runs counter to the policies underlying the 
1933 and 1934 Acts”).  
 15. James D. Cox, Making Securities Fraud Class Actions Virtuous, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 497, 509 
(1997) (“[R]esponsible officers and directors only rarely contribute to the recovery.”); see also Sherrie 
R. Savett, The Merits Matter Most and Observations on a Changing Landscape Under the Private 
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 525, 527 (1997) (“Plaintiffs’ counsel will 
often settle with officer and director defendants who are usually the most culpable defendants within 
policy limits because there is little incentive to refuse a bird in hand and go outside policy limits.”). 
 16. See Savett, supra note 15, at 527 (“Where the corporate defendant is solvent, in most 
instances it contributes to a settlement anywhere from 10-50% of the ultimate amount agreed to, 
usually at the insistence of the insurance carrier.”).  
 https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol80/iss3/9
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The settlement process therefore leaves us with a scheme of exclusively 
vicarious corporate liability. The revelation of the fraud and subsequent 
lawsuit may lead to the firing of the offending manager in a small percentage 
of cases, but that sanction is simply the adverse outcome that the manager 
sought to avoid. If termination is the only sanction, and that sanction is 
applied in only a percentage of cases, fraud may still be a gamble worth 
taking for the corporate manager—she would likely find herself out of work, 
even if she did not commit the fraud. Likewise, if insider trading was the 
motivation for the misstatement, a settlement paid by the corporation would 
do nothing to disgorge the insider’s ill-gotten gains. Failing to sanction the 
wrongdoers responsible for the fraud means that the threat of a class action 
lawsuit does little to deter those wrongdoers, thus substantially undermining 
the deterrent value of such suits. 
We could do better with a class action regime that focused on deterrence 
rather than compensation. Instead of a compensation-based damages 
measure, we could use a damages measure premised on unjust enrichment.17 
Managers who distort stock prices in order to manipulate a stock price-based 
compensation scheme would be forced to disgorge the excess gains; insider 
traders would be forced to give up their profits.18 Because the potential 
recovery would be modest, it could be made uninsurable and 
unindemnifiable without discouraging individuals from serving as corporate 
officers and directors.19 In a scheme properly focused on deterrence, the 
corporation’s “deep pocket” is no longer needed to assure a viable funding 
source for a judgment. If the company actually benefitted from the fraud, it 
could be forced to disgorge its benefits as well; if it did not, it should not be a 
party to the suit. If we eliminate the corporation altogether as a defendant, we 
greatly reduce the ability of managers to shift sanctions from themselves to 
the corporation. 
So it turns out that we should care that institutional investors do not care 
enough to file claims in securities fraud class actions. The theoretical case for 
compensation in cases of open-market fraud has been under attack for a long 
time. If we add to that theoretical weakness the fact that a substantial 
 17. The Supreme Court left open the question of damages when it recognized the fraud-on-the-
market class action in Basic, Inc. v. Levinson. 485 U.S. 224, 248 n.28 (1988). 
 18. See Alexander, supra note 8, at 1515 (advocating “the disgorgement of any benefits 
defendants received from the violation, such as proceeds from any transactions they engaged in during 
the period of nondisclosure, increases in the value of stock options, or other compensation tied to the 
misleading statements or to the stock price during the period of nondisclosure”). 
 19. Alexander, supra note 8, at 1512 (“A relatively small penalty to be paid personally (and by 
law made uninsurable and not indemnifiable) could have a larger deterrent effect on individuals than a 
much larger compensatory judgment to be paid by the corporation and its insurers.”).  
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percentage of investors cannot be bothered to make claims, the case against 
compensation becomes overwhelming.  
The question of compensation versus deterrence is not a purely academic 
one. Post-Enron, Congress is considering a variety of bills that would roll 
back the limitations imposed by the Private Securities Litigation Reform 
Act20 and expand the ability of investors to recover their losses through 
securities class actions.21 Legislators would do well to assess any such reform 
proposals against the standard of deterrence. Reforms geared toward 
enhancing compensation should be left on the table. 
 20. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
volume fifteen of the United States Code). 
 21. See Abner J. Mikva, Share and Shares Alike, LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 8, 2002, at 50 (calling for 
repeal of the PSLRA). 
 https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol80/iss3/9
